I have been following the tragedy of the Costa Concordia cruise ship, wondering how a modern ship with such sophisticated navigation systems could strike a rock and cause such a tragedy.
Here is the ground track of ship and here is an analysis of the situation by professional mariners.
This can’t be anything other than human error… but then, “to error is human.”
Here is an analysis of the black box of the Air France Crash over the Atlantic in which three experienced pilots did exactly the wrong thing, causing the plane to crash in to ocean:
And the main puzzle, as several of the initial stories point out, is why a team of experienced pilots would have kept pulling back on the controls, to increase the nose-up pitch, when the stall warnings were going off. This is a puzzle because being trained to do exactly the opposite is practically the foundation of learn-to-fly courses. If a plane is losing speed and threatening to stall, you recover by pointing the nose sharply down and adding power (plus other things). This reduces the angle of attack, builds air speed, and allows the wings to start providing lift once again.
From a complexity systems’ perspective, these are pretty simple situations… Even though the cruise ship or the aircraft are incredibly complicated machines, they were responding to simple controls. I wouldn’t be surprised if the captain of the Costa Concordia could have maneuvered the giant ship with a joystick or a mouse click. The Airbus behaved exactly as commanded by the pilot, holding the stick in the far back position.
It’s hard to imagine a simpler instruction to a ship’s captain than a prime directive: “Don’t run your ship on to the rocks.” And every student pilot learns to lower the nose in case of a stall. Not quite as intuitive, but after a few stomach-churning stalls, the student quickly learns the lesson. Yet, as simple and intuitive as these lessons are, they have been the cause of two recent tragedies.
Now, let’s look at medical care. Early in their studies, medical students get an ancient but still current prime directive: primum non nocere – “First, do no harm.”
Managing a patient, however, is much more difficult than moving a joystick on the console of a ship or plane. People’s lives are at stake, and the deaths occur in isolation, rather than spectacular media events. But, taken as a whole, they constitute a far greater tragedy than what hits the front pages or twitter’s most popular hash tags. The Institute of Medicine estimates that at least 44,000 patients die each year from preventable medical errors. A commendable report from Patient Safety Commission in Oregon (1.2% of the US population) tallied 32 preventable patient deaths:
At least 32 patients died as a result of preventable errors in Oregon hospitals last year, according to a report released Thursday by the Oregon Patient Safety Commission. Hospitals reported 136 incidents in 2009… half of the incidents resulted in serious injury or death. In nine cases, a surgical team operated on the wrong body part or the wrong patient. Surgeons accidentally left objects in patients 21 times… The reporting system may underestimate the extent of preventable errors.
In a way, a surgeon operating on the wrong patient is similar to The Costa Concordia’s captain steering his ship onto rocks or the Air France pilots flying their plane into the ocean. These never should have happened, there are no shades of gray. Today, the world is abuzz about in a global media frenzy showing the overturned ship with 6 deaths. This will soon fade, to be replaced by some other event showing even more mediagenic misery.
But patients will continue to die from preventable errors. From the Oregon report:
Reports of objects accidentally left in surgical patients have declined from a high of 50 in 2007, but the number has persisted at around 40 incidents a year since 2002, leading the commission to conclude that hospitals have not made meaningful progress in reducing such errors.
“There is no indication that it’s going down, which is frustrating,” Dameron said. “Oregon is not unique there. It’s a stubborn problem.”